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Abstract
Belief revision is the process in which an agent incorporates
a new piece of information together with a pre-existing set
of beliefs. When the new information comes in the form of a
report from another agent, then it is clear that we must first
determine whether or not that agent should be trusted. In this
paper, we provide a formal approach to modeling trust as a
pre-processing step before belief revision. We emphasize that
trust is not simply a relation between agents; the trust that one
agent has in another is often restricted to a particular domain
of expertise. We demonstrate that this form of trust can be
captured by associating a state-partition with each agent, then
relativizing all reports to this state partition before performing
belief revision. In this manner, we incorporate only the part
of a report that falls under the perceived domain of expertise
of the reporting agent. Unfortunately, state partitions based
on expertise do not allow us to compare the relative strength
of trust held with respect to different agents. To address this
problem, we introduce pseudometrics over states to represent
differing degrees of trust. This allows us to incorporate simul-
taneous reports from multiple agents in a way that ensures the
most trusted reports will be believed.
Introduction
The notion of trust must be addressed in many agent com-
munication systems. In this paper, we consider one isoloated
aspect of trust: the manner in which trust impacts the process
of belief revision. Some of the most influential approaches
to belief revision have used the simplifying assumption that
all new information must be incorporated; however, this is
clearly untrue in cases where information comes from an
untrusted source. In this paper, we are concerned with the
manner in which an agent uses an external notion of trust
in order to determine how new information should be inte-
grated with some pre-existing set of beliefs.
Our basic approach is the following. We introduce a sim-
ple model of trust that allows an agent to determine if a
source can be trusted to distinguish between different pairs
of states. We use this notion of trust as a precursor to belief
revision. Hence, before revising by a new formula, an agent
first determines to what extent the source of the information
can be trusted. In many cases, the agent will only incorpo-
rate “part” of the formula into their beliefs. We then extend
our model of trust to a more general setting, by introducing
quantitative measures of trust that allow us to compare the
degree to which different agents are trusted. Fundamental
properties are introduced and established, and applications
are considered.
Preliminaries
Intuition
It is important to note that an agent typically does not trust
another agent universally. As such, we will not apply the la-
bel “trusted” to another agent; instead, we will say that an
agent is trusted with respect to a certain domain of knowl-
edge. This is further complicated by the fact that there are
different reasons that an agent may not be trusted. For ex-
ample, an agent might not be trusted due to their perceived
knowledge of a domain. In other cases, an agent might not
be trusted due to their perceived dishonesty, or bias. In this
paper, our primary focus is on trust as a function of the per-
ceived expertise of other agents. Towards the end, we briefly
address the different formal mechanisms that would be re-
quired to deal with deceit.
Motivating Example
We introduce a motivating example in commonsense reason-
ing where an agent must rely on an informal notion of trust
in order to inform rational belief change; we will return to
this example periodically as we introduce our formal model.
Consider an agent that visits a doctor, having difficulty
breathing. Incidentally, the agent is wearing a necklace that
prominently features a jewel on a pendant. During the exam-
ination, the doctor checks the patient’s throat for swelling or
obstruction; at the same time, the doctor happens to look at
the necklace. Following the examination, the doctor tells the
patient “you have a viral infection in your throat - and by the
way, you should know that the jewel in your necklace is not
a diamond.”
The important part about this example is the fact that the
doctor provides information about two distinct domains: hu-
man health and jewelry. In practice, a patient is very likely to
trust the doctor’s diagnosis about the viral infection. On the
other hand, the patient really has very little reason to trust the
doctor’s evaluation of the necklace. We suggest that a ratio-
nal agent should actually incorporate the doctor’s statement
about the infection into their own beliefs, while essentially
ignoring the comment on the necklace. This approach is dic-
tated by the kind of trust that the patient has in the doctor.
Our aim in this paper is to formalize this kind of “localized”
domain-specific trust, and then demonstrate how this form
of trust is used in practice to inform belief revision.
Trust
Trust consists of two related components. First, we can think
of trust in terms of how likely an agent is to believe what an-
other agent says. Alternatively, we can think of trust in terms
of the degree to which an agent is likely to allow another to
perform actions on their behalf. In this paper, we will be
concerned only with the former.
A great deal of existing work on trust focuses on
the manner in which an agent develops a reputation
based on past behaviour. A brief survey of reputation
systems is given in (Huynh, Jennings, and Shadbolt 2006).
Reputation systems can be used to inform the alloca-
tion of tasks (Ramchurn et al. 2009), or to avoid decep-
tion (Salehi-Abari and White 2009). The model of trust pre-
sented in this paper is not intended to be an alternative to
existing reputation systems; we are not concerned with the
manner in which an agent learns to trust another. Instead, our
focus is simply on developing a suitable model of trust that
is expressive enough to inform the process of belief revision.
The manner in which this model of trust is developed over
time is beyond the scope of this paper.
Belief Revision
Belief revision refers to the process in which an agent must
integrate new information with some pre-existing beliefs
about the state of the world. One of the most influential ap-
proaches to belief revision is the AGM approach, in which
an agent incorporates the new information while keeping
as much of the intial belief state as consistently possible
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985).
This approach was originally defined with respect to a fi-
nite set P of propositional variables representing properties
of the world. A state is a propositional interpretation over
P , representing a possible state of the world. A belief set is
a deductively closed set of formulas, representing the beliefs
of an agent. Since P is finite, it follows that every belief set
defines a corresponding belief state, which is the set of states
that an agent considers to be possible. A revision operator is
a function that takes a belief set and a formula as input, and
returns a new belief set. An AGM revision operator is a revi-
sion operator that satisfies the AGM postulates, as specified
in (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985).
It turns out that every AGM revision operator is charac-
terized by a total pre-order over possible worlds. To be more
precise, a faithful assignment is a function that maps each
belief set to a total pre-order over states in which the mod-
els of the belief set are the minimal states. When an agent
is presented with a new formula φ for revision, the revised
belief state is the set of all minimal models of φ in the to-
tal pre-order given by the faithful assignment. We refer the
reader to (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992) for a proof of this
result, as well as a complete description of the implications.
For our purposes, we simply need to know that each AGM
revision operator necessarily defines a faithful assignment.
A Model of Trust
Domain-Specific Trust
Assume we have a fixed propositional signature F as well
as a set of agents A. For each A ∈ A, let BelA denote a
deductively closed set of formulas over F called the belief
set of A. For each A, let ∗A denote an AGM revision opera-
tor that intuitively captures the way that the agent A revises
their beliefs when presented with new information. This re-
vision operator represents sort of an “ideal” revision situa-
tion, in which A has complete trust in the new information.
We want to modify the way this operator is used, by adding
a representation of the extent to which A trusts each other
agent B ∈ A over F.
We assume that all new information is reported by an
agent, so each formula for revision can be labelled with the
name of the reporting agent.1 At this point, we are not con-
cerned with degrees of trust or with resolving conflicts be-
tween different sources of information. Instead, we start with
a binary notion of trust, where A either trusts B or does not
trust B with respect to a particular domain of expertise.
We encode trust by allowing each agent A to associate a
partition ΠB
A
over possible states with each agent B.
Definition 1 A state partition Π is a collection of subsets
of 2F that is collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
For any state s ∈ 2F, let Π(s) denote the element of Π that
contains s.
If Π = {2F} then we call Π the trivial partition with respect
to F. If Π = {{s} | s ∈ 2F}, then we call Π the unit
partition.
Definition 2 For each A ∈ A the trust function TA is a
function that maps each B ∈ A to a state partition ΠB
A
.
The partition ΠB
A
represents the trust that A has in B over
different aspects of knowledge. Informally, the partition en-
codes states that A will trust B to distinguish. If ΠB
A
(s1) 6=
ΠB
A
(s2), then A will trust that B can distinguish between
states s1 and s2. Conversely, if ΠBA(s1) = ΠBA(s2), then A
does not see B as an authority capable of distinguishing be-
tween s1 and s2. We clarify by returning to our motivating
example.
Example Let A = {A,D, J} and let F = {sick, diam}.
Informally, the fluent sick is true if A has an illness and
the fluent diam is true if a certain piece of jewelry that A
is wearing contains a real diamond. If we imagine that D
represents a doctor and J represents a jeweler, then we can
use state partitions to represent the trust that A has in D
and J with respect to different domains. Following standard
shorthand notation, we represent a state s by the set of fluent
symbols that are true in s. In order to make the descriptions
of a partition more readable, we use a | symbol to visually
1This is not a significant restriction. In domains involving sens-
ing or other forms of discovery, we could simply allow an agent A
to self-report information with complete trust.
separate different cells. The following partitions are then in-
tuitively plausible in this example:
ΠDA := {sick, diam}, {sick}|{diam}, ∅
ΠJA := {sick, diam}, {diamond}|{sick}, ∅
Hence, A trusts the doctor D to distinguish between states
where A is sick as opposed to states where A is not sick.
However, A does not trust D to distinguish between worlds
that are differentiated by the authenticity of a diamond. The
formula sick ∧ ¬diamond encodes the doctor’s statement
that the agent is sick, and the necklace they are wearing has
a fake diamond.
Although the preceding example is simple, it illustrates
how a partition can be used to encode the perceived expertise
of agents. In the doctor-jeweler example, we could equiva-
lently have defined trust with respect to the set of fluents.
In other words, we could have simply said that D is trusted
over the fluent sick. However, there are many practical cases
where this is not sufficient; we do not want to rely on the
fluent vocabulary to determine what is a valid feature with
respect to trust. For example, a doctor may have specific ex-
pertise over lung infections for those working in factories,
but not for lung infections for those working in a space shut-
tle. By using state partitions to encode trust, we are able to
capture a very flexible class of distinct areas of trust.
Incorporating Trust in Belief Revision
As indicated previously, we assume each agent A has an
AGM belief revision operator ∗A for incorporating new in-
formation. In this section, we describe how the revision op-
erator ∗A is combined with the trust function TA to define
a new, trust-incorporating revision operator ∗B
A
. In many
cases, the operator ∗B
A
will not be an AGM operator because
it will fail to satisfy the AGM postulates. In particular,Awill
not necessarily believe a new formula when it is reported by
an untrusted source. This is a desirable feature.
Our approach is to define revision as a two-step process.
First, the agent considers the source and the relevant state
partition to determine how much of the new information to
incorporate. Second, the agent performs standard AGM re-
vision using the faithful assignment corresponding to the be-
lief revision operator.
Definition 3 Let φ be a formula and let TA(B) = ΠBA . De-fine:
ΠBA [φ] =
⋃
{ΠBA(s) | s |= φ}.
Hence ΠB
A
[φ] is the union of all cells that contain a model of
φ.
If A does not trust B to distinguish between states s and
t, then any report from B that provides evidence that s is the
actual state is also evidence that t is the actual state. When
A performs belief revision, it should be with respect to the
distinctions that B can be trusted to make. It follows that A
need not believe φ after revision; instead A should interpret
φ to be evidence of any state s that is B-indistinguishable
from a model of φ. Formally, this means that the formula φ
is construed to be evidence for each state in ΠB
A
[φ].
Definition 4 Let A,B ∈ A with TA(B) = ΠBA , and let
∗A be an AGM revision operator for A. For any belief set
K with corresponding ordering≺K given by the underlying
faithful assignment, the trust-sensitive revision K ∗B
A
φ is the
set of formulas true in
min
≺K
({s | s ∈ ΠBA [φ]}).
So rather than taking the minimal models of φ, we take all
minimal states that B can not be trusted to distinguish from
the minimal models of φ.
It is worth remarking that this notion can be formulated
synactically as well. Since F is finite, each state s is defined
by a unique, maximal conjunction over literals in F; we sim-
ply take the conjunction of all the atomic formulas that are
true in s together with the negation of all the atomic formu-
las that are false in s.
Definition 5 For any state s, let prop(s) denote the unique,
maximal conjunction of literals true in s.
This definition can be extended for a cell in a state partition.
Definition 6 Let Π be a state partition. For any state s,
prop(Π(s)) =
∨
{prop(s′) | s′ ∈ Π(s)}.
Note that prop(Π(s)) is a well-defined formula in disjunc-
tive normal form, due to the finiteness of F. Intuitively,
prop(Π(s)) is the formula that defines the partition Π(s).
In the case of a trust partition ΠB
A
, we can use this idea to
define the trust expansion of a formula.
Definition 7 Let A,B ∈ A with the corresponding state
partition ΠBA , and let φ be a formula. The trust expansion of
φ for A with respect to B is the formula
φBA :=
∨
{prop(ΠBA(s)) | s |= φ}.
Note that this is a finite disjunction of disjunctions, which
is again a well defined formula. We refer to φB
A
as the trust
expansion of φ because it is true in all states that are consis-
tent with φ with respect to distinctions that A trusts B to be
able to make. It is an expansion because the set of models of
φB
A
is normally larger than the set of models of φ. The trust
sensitive revision operator could equivalently be defined as
the normal revision, following translation of φ to the corre-
sponding trust expansion.
Example Returning to our example, we consider a few
different formulas for revision:
1. φ1 = sick
2. φ2 = ¬diam
3. φ3 = sick ∧ ¬diam.
Suppose that the agent initially believes that they are not
sick, and that the diamond they have is real, so K = ¬sick∧
diam. For simplicity, we will assume that the underlying
pre-order ≺K has only two levels: those states where K is
true are minimal, and those where K is false are not. We
have the following results for revision
1. K ∗D
A
φ1 = sick ∧ diam
2. K ∗D
A
φ2 = ¬sick ∧ diam
3. K ∗DA φ3 = sick ∧ diam.
The first result indicates that A believes the doctor when the
doctor reports that they are sick. The second result indicates
that A essentially ignores a report from the doctor on the
subject of jewelry. The third result is perhaps the most inter-
esting. It demonstrates that our approach allows an agent to
just incorporate a part of a formula. Hence, even though φ3
is given as a single piece of information, the agent A only
incorporates the part of the formula over which the doctor is
trusted.
Formal Properties
Basic Results
We first consider extreme cases for trust-sensitive revision
operators. Intuitively, if TA(B) is the trivial partition, then
A does not trust B to be able to distinguish between any
states. Therefore, A should not incorporate any new infor-
mation obtained from B. The following proposition makes
this observation explicit.
Proposition 1 If TA(B) is the trivial partition, then K ∗BA
φ = K for all K and φ.
The other extreme situation occurs when TA(B) is the unit
partition, which consists of all singleton sets. In this case,
A trusts B to be able to distinguish between every possible
pair of states. It follows from this result that trust sensitive
revision operators are not AGM revision operators.
Proposition 2 If TA(B) is the unit partition, then ∗BA = ∗A.
Hence, if B is universally trusted, then the corresponding
trust sensitive revision operator is just the a priori revision
operator for A.
Refinements
There is a partial ordering on partitions based on the notion
of refinement. We say that Π1 is a refinement of Π2 just in
case, for each S1 ∈ Π1, there exists S2 ∈ Π2 such that S1 ⊆
S2. We also say that Π1 is finer than Π2. In terms of trust-
partitions, refinement has a natural interpretation in terms
of “breadth of trust.” If the partition corresponding to B is
finer than that corresponding to C, it means that B is trusted
more broadly than C. To be more precise, it means that B
is trusted to distinguish between all of the states that C can
distinguish, and possibly more. If B is trusted more broadly
that C, it follows that a report from B should give give A
more information. This idea is formalized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 For any formula φ, if ΠB
A
is a refinement of
ΠC
A
, then |K ∗B
A
φ| ⊆ |K ∗C
A
φ|.
This is a desirable property; if B is trusted over a greater
range of states, then fewer states are possible after a report
from B.
Multiple Reports
One natural question that arises is how to deal with multiple
reports of information from different agents, with different
trust partitions. In our example, for instance, we might get
a conflicting report from a jeweler with respect to the sta-
tus of the necklace. In order to facilitate the discussion, we
introduce a precise notion of a report.
Definition 8 A report is a pair (B, φ), where B ∈ A and φ
is a formula.
We can now extend the definition of trust senstive revision to
reports in the obvious manner. In fact, if the revising agentA
is clear from the context, we can use the short hand notation:
K ∗ (φ,B) = K ∗BA φ.
The following definition extends the notion of revision to
incorporate multiple reports.
Definition 9 Let {A} ∪ B ⊆ A, and let Φ = {(φi, Bi) |
i < n} be a finite set of reports. Given K , ∗ and ≺K , the
trust-sensitive revision K ∗A Φ is the set of formulas true in
min
≺K
({s | s ∈ ΠBiA [φi]}).
So the trust sensitive revision for a finite set of reports from
different agents is essentially the normal, single-shot revi-
sion by the conjunction of formulas. The only difference is
that we expand each formula with respect to the trust parti-
tion for a particular reporting agent.
Example In the doctor and jeweler domain, we can con-
sider how how an agent might incorporate a set of reports
from D and J . We start with the same initial belief set as
before: K = ¬sick∧diam. Consider the following reports:
1. Φ1 = {(sick,D), (¬diam,D)}
2. Φ2 = {(sick, J), (¬diam, J)}
3. Φ3 = {(sick,D), (¬diam, J)}
4. Φ4 = {(sick, J), (¬diam,D)}
We have the following results following revision:
1. K ∗A Φ1 = sick ∧ diam
2. K ∗A Φ2 = ¬sick ∧ ¬diam
3. K ∗A Φ3 = sick ∧ ¬diam
4. K ∗A Φ4 = ¬sick ∧ diam.
These results demonstrate how the agent A essentially in-
corporates information from D and J in domains where
they are trusted, and ignores information when they are not
trusted. Note that, in this case, D and J are trusted over dis-
joint sets of states. As a result, it is not possible to have con-
tradictory reports that are equally trusted.
The problem with Definition 9 is that the set of states in
the minimization may be empty. This occurs when multiple
agents give conflicting reports, and we trust each agent on
the domain. In order to resolve this kind of conflict, we need
a more expressive form of trust that allows some agents to be
trusted more than others. We introduce such a representation
in the next section.
Trust Pseudometrics
Measuring Trust
In the previous section, we were concerned with a binary no-
tion of trust that did not include any measure of the strength
of trust held in a particular agent or domain. Such an ap-
proach is appropriate in cases where we only receive new
information from a single source, or from a set of sources
that are equally reliable. However, it is not sufficient if we
consider cases where several different sources may provide
conflicting information. In such cases, we need to determine
which information source is the most trust worthy with re-
spect to the domain currently under consideration.
In the binary approach, we associated a partition of the
state space with each agent. In order to capture different lev-
els of trust, we would like to introduce a measure of the dis-
tance between two states from the perspective of a particular
agent. In other words, an agent A would like to associate a
distance function dB over states with each other agent B.
If dB(s, t) = 0, then B can not be trusted to distinguish
between the states s and t. On the other hand, if dB(s, t)
is very large, then A has a high level of trust in B’s abil-
ity to distinguish between s and t. The notion of distance
that we introduce will be a psuedometric on the state space.
A pseudometric is a function d that satisfies the following
properties for all x, y, z in the domain X :
1. d(x, x) = 0
2. d(x, y) = d(y, x)
3. d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z)
The difference between a metric and a pseudometric is that
we do not require that d(x, y) = 0 implies x = y (the so-
called law of indiscernables). This would be undesirable in
our setting, because we want to use the distance 0 to rep-
resent states that are indistinguishable rather than identical.
The first two properties are clearly desirable for a measure
of our trust in another agent’s ability to discern states. The
third property is the triangle inequality, and it is required to
guarantee that our trust in other agents is transititive across
different domains.
Definition 10 For each A ∈ A, a pseudometric trust func-
tion TA is a function that maps each B ∈ A to a pseudomet-
ric dB over 2F.
The pair (2F, TA) is called a pseudometric trust space. We
would like to model the situation where a sequence of for-
mulas Φ = φ1, . . . , φn is received from the agents B =
B1, . . . , Bn, respectively. Note that the order does not mat-
ter, we think of the formulas as arriving at the same instant
with no preference between them other than the preference
induced by the pseudometric trust space.
We associate a sequence of state partitions with each
pseudometric trust space.
Proposition 4 Let (2F, TA) be a pseudometric trust space,
let B ∈ A−A, and let i be a natural number. For each state
s, define the set ΦA
B
(i)(s) as follows:
ΠAB(i)(s) = {t | dB(s, t) ≤ i}.
The collection of sets {ΠA
B
(i)(s) | s ∈ 2F} is a state parti-
tion.
We let ΠA
B
(i) denote the state partition obtained from this
proposition. The cells of the partition ΠA
B
(i) consist of all
states are separated by a distance of no more than i. The
following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 5 ΠA
B
(i) is a refinement of ΠA
B
(j), for any i <
j.
Hence, a pseudometric trust space defines a sequence of
partitions for each agent. This sequence of partitions gets
coarser as we increase the index; increasing the index corre-
sponds to requiring a higher level of trust that an agent can
distinguish between states. Since we can use Definition 4 to
define a trust sensitive revision operator from a state parti-
tion, we can now define a trust sensitive revision operator
for any fixed distance i between states. Informally, as i in-
creases, we requireB to have a greater degree of certainty in
order to trust them to distinguish between states. However, it
is not clear in advance exactly which i is the right threshold.
Our approach will be to find the lowest possible threshold
that yields a consistent result.
Note that ΠA
B
(i) will be a trivial partition for any i that is
less than the minimum distance assigned by the underlying
pseudometric trust function.
Definition 11 Let (2F, TA) be a pseudometric trust space,
and let m be the least natural number such that ΠA
B
(m) is
non-trival. The trust sensitive revision operator for A with
respect to B is the trust sensitive revision operator given by
ΠA
B
(m).
This is a simple extension of our approach based on state
partitions. In the next section, we take advantage of the
added expressive power of pseudometrics.
Example We modify the doctor example. In order to con-
sider different levels of trust, it is more interesting to con-
sider a domain involving two doctors: a general practitioner
D and a specialist S. We also assume that the vocabulary in-
cludes two fluents: ear and skin. Informally, ear is under-
stood to be true if the patient has an ear infection, whereas
skin is true if the patient has skin cancer. The important
point is that an ear infection is something that can easily be
diagnosed by any doctor, whereas skin cancer is typically
diagnosed by a specialist. In order to capture these facts, we
define two pseudometrics dD and dS . For simplicity, we la-
bel the possible states as follows:
s1 = {ear, skin}
s2 = {ear}
s3 = {skin}
s4 = ∅
We define the pseudometrics as follows: With these pseudo-
s1, s2 s1, s3 s1, s4 s2, s3 s2, s4 s3, s4
dD 1 2 2 2 2 1
dS 2 2 2 2 2 2
metrics, it is easy to see that bothD and S can distinguish all
of the states. However, S is more trusted to distinguish be-
tween states related to a skin cancer diagnosis. In our frame-
work, we would like to ensure that this implies S will be
trusted in the case of conflicting reports from D and S with
respect to skin cancer.
Multiple Reports
We view the distances in a pseudometric trust space as abso-
lute measurements. As such, if dB(s, t) > dC(s, t), then we
have greater trust in B as opposed toC as far as the ability to
discern the states s and t is concerned. We would like to use
this intuition to resolve conflicting reports between agents.
Proposition 6 Let {A} ∪ B ⊆ A, and let Φ = {(φi, Bi) |
i < n} be a finite set of reports. There exists a natural num-
ber m such that
⋂
i<n
(ΠBiA [φi](m)) 6= ∅.
Hence, for any set of reports, we can get a non-intersecting
intersection if we take a sufficiently coarse state partition.
In many cases this partition will be non-trival. Using this
proposition, we define multiple report revision as follows.
Definition 12 Let (2F, TA) be a pseudometric trust space,
let Φ = {(φi, Bi) | i < n} be a finite set of re-
ports, and let m be the least natural number such that⋂
i<n
(ΠBiA [φi](m)) 6= ∅. Given K , ∗ and ≺K , the trust-
sensitive revision K ∗B
A
Φ is the set of formulas true in
min
≺K
({s | s ∈ ΠBiA [φi](m)}).
Hence, trust-sensitive revision in this context involves find-
ing the finest possible partition that provides a meaningful
combination of the reports, and then revising with the corre-
sponding state partition.
Trust and Deceit
To this point, we have only been concerned with modeling
the trust that one agent holds in another due to perceived
knowledge or expertise. Of course, the issue of trust also
arises in cases where one agent suspects that another may
be dishonest. However, the manner in which trust must be
handled differs greatly in this context. If A does not trust
B, then there is little reason for A to believe any part of a
message sent directly from B.
Discussion
Related Work
We are not aware of any other work on trust that explic-
itly deals with the interaction between trust and formal be-
lief revision operators. There is, however, a great deal of
work on frameworks for modelling trust. As noted previ-
ously, the focus of such work is often on building reputa-
tions. One notable approach to this problem with an empha-
sis on knowledge representation is (Wang and Singh 2007),
in which trust is built based on evidence. This kind of ap-
proach could be used as a precursor step to build a trust met-
ric, although one would need to account for domain exper-
tise.
Different levels of trust are treated in
(Krukow and Nielsen 2007), where a lattice structure
is used to represent various levels of trust strength. This is
similar to our notion of a trust pseudometric, but it permits
incomparable elements. There are certainly situations where
this is a reasonable advantage. However, the emphasis is
still on the representation of trust in an agent as opposed to
trust in an agent with respect to a domain.
One notable approach that is similar to ours is the seman-
tics of trust presented in (Krukow and Nielsen 2007), which
is a domain-based approach to differential trust in an agent.
The emphasis there is on trust management, however. That
is, the authors are concerned with how agents maintain some
record of trust in the other agents; they are not concerned
with a differential approach to belief revision.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an approach to trust sen-
sitive belief revision in which an agent is trusted only with
respect to a particular domain. This has been formally ac-
complished first by using state partitions to indicate which
states an agent can be trusted to distinguish, and then by us-
ing distance functions to quantify the strength of trust. In
both cases, the model of trust is used as sort of a precursor
to belief revision. Each agent is able to perform belief revi-
sion based on a pre-order over states, but the actual formula
for revision is parametrized and expanded based on the level
of trust held in the reporting agent.
There are many directions for future work, in terms of
both theory and applications. As noted previously, one of the
subtle distinctions that must be addressed is the difference
between trusted expertise and trusted honesty. The present
framework does not explicitly deal with the problem of de-
ception or belief manipulation (Hunter 2013); it would be
useful to explore how models of trust must differ in this con-
text. In terms of applications, our approach could be used in
any domain where agents must make decisions based on be-
liefs formulated from multiple reports. This is the case, for
example, in many networked communication systems.
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